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I. INTRODUCTION
Extreme weather events,' which are occurring with increasing
frequency as a result of climate change,2 threaten the reliability
and resilience of the nation's electricity grid. Increased flooding
due to intense rainfall, hurricane damage fueled in part by a
warmer atmosphere and warmer, higher seas, and widespread
wildfires caused by extended drought conditions constitute
potential hazards for utility infrastructure and delivery of
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University College of Law; LL.M., Pace University College of Law; J.D., University of Iowa
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1. The National Climate Assessment's discussion of "extreme weather events"
includes heat waves, drought, heavy downpours, floods, hurricanes, and increased frequency
and intensity of other storms. Extreme Weather, NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/extreme-weather#intro-section-
2 (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
2. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), "[a]
changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration and
timing of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented extreme
weather and climate events." WORKING GROUPS I AND II OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to
Advance Climate Change Adaptation 7 (Field et al. eds., 2012), https://wgl.ipcc.ch/srex/
downloads/SREX-AllFINAL.pdf.
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essential electricity service.3 As a possible adaptation strategy,
increased deployment of distributed energy resources (DERs),
which are small-scale generating resources located near-and
connected to-a load being served with or without grid
interconnection,4 can improve the resilience of the electric system
in the face of the increasing frequency of extreme weather
events, by avoiding some of the systemic vulnerabilities of a
centralized large grid.5
The experience of Hurricane Sandy (ultimately downgraded
to "Superstorm" Sandy by the time it hit the coasts of New York
and New Jersey in late October 2012) provides a case study of
the resilience benefits of DERs, and the lessons that can be
learned as utilities plan for increasingly frequent extreme weather
events of the future. Superstorm Sandy was the deadliest and
most destructive hurricane of the 2012 Atlantic hurricane season,
resulting in 286 deaths and $68 billion in damages.6 The storm's
diameter extended almost 1,000 miles, and produced a storm
surge of 14 feet at the Battery in lower Manhattan that was at
least three feet higher than prior reported storm tides.7
Approximately 8.5 million utility customers along the eastern
U.S. lost power during Sandy.8 Apart from the sheer magnitude of
the disaster in terms of fatalities and destruction, Superstorm
Sandy provided a "wake up call" for energy providers, and electric
utilities in particular, on the need to adopt a different set of
long-term planning tools to improve the resilience of the electric
system to cope with the anticipated extreme weather events of
the future.
One such tool is an expanded role for DERs and microgrids.
If the electrical grid is impaired, DERs can be configured to
"island" from the grid, thereby ensuring an uninterrupted supply
3. NYS 2100 COMMIssIoN, RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE STRENGTH AND
RESILIENCE OF THE EMPIRE STATE'S INFRASTRUCTURE 182, http://www.governor.ny.gov/
assets/documents/NYS2100.pdf [hereinafter NYS 2100 COMMISSION REPORT] (defining
Distributed Generation (DG) as "[s]mall electrical power generators installed in homes,
businesses, and office buildings, that can supply power to a location when grid power is not
available.").
4. Id. at 97-98.
5. Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, "Virtual Power Plants," and the
Smart Grid, 7 ENVT'L & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 191, 193 (2012) ("Given the urgency to
address climate change, [distributed energy resources] have become especially important as
part of a portfolio of solutions to reduce fossil fuel use (and resulting GHG emissions) in the
electricity sector of the economy and adapt to the changing climate.").
6. Ejaz Kahn, 10 Most Destructive Hurricanes in U.S. History, WONDERSLIST, http://
www.wonderslist.com/10-destructive-hurricanes-u-s-history/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
7. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Case 13-E-0030 Before the
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n at 14-15, http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.
aspx?DocRefld={A3EFED44-5E61-42B6-9348-7AB59BAA8CB5} (testimony of Electric
Infrastructure and Operations Panel).
8. Id. at 15.
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of power to utility customers within a "microgrid."9 That was the
experience from Superstorm Sandy, where the use of microgrids
and DERs enabled power to be provided to pockets of consumers
in the face of widespread outages of central power plants and
the associated transmission and distribution (T&D) systems. While
extended power outages affected the region for days, many
commercial and industrial facilities and educational institutions
in the area (including Princeton University's campus in New
Jersey and New York University's campus in lower Manhattan)
were able to continue operating uninterrupted, due to on-site
DG facilities, primarily cogeneration or combined heat and power
(CHP) facilities.10 DG resources offer the opportunity to improve
the resilience of the electrical grid, mitigating the impacts of an
emergency by keeping critical facilities running without any
interruption in service."
At the same time, it is difficult to quantify the resilience
value of DERs and microgrids. To what extent is the grid more
resilient due to the presence of DERs? What are the tools available
to place a value on this increased resilience? Is it possible to
place a value on the continued availability of critical facilities
during an extended grid outage? As states move away from
compensating DERs through net metering-based on the serving
utility's retail rate toward a system based on paying DERs
according to their actual contributions to the grid-it becomes
increasingly important to try to place a value on the resilience
9. Microgrids are small-scale distribution systems that link and coordinate multiple
DG resources into a network serving some or all of the energy needs of users located in close
proximity and can be "islanded" to operate independently from the utility grid. NYS 2100
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 95 n.b ("Microgrids refers to clusters of homes and
buildings that share a local electric power generation and/or energy storage device while
disconnected from the utility grid.").
10. A CHP system is a highly efficient form of DG, typically designed to power a single
large building, campus or group of facilities. CHP systems consist of an on-site electrical
generator (primarily fueled with natural gas) that achieve high levels of efficiency through
capturing heat, a byproduct of electricity generation that would otherwise be wasted. The
captured heat can be used to provide steam or hot water to the facility for space heating,
cooling or other processes. "Capturing and using the waste heat allows CHP systems to
reach fuel efficiencies of up to 80%, compared with about 45% for conventional separate heat
and power." ANNE HAMPSON ET AL., ICF INT'L, COMBINED HEAT AND POWER: ENABLING
RESILIENT ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CRITICAL FACILITIES 4 (Mar. 2013)
[hereinafter ICFREPORT], http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/distributedenergy/
pdfs/chp-critical-facilities.pdf. CHP systems typically use the utility grid as a backup source
to meet peak electricity needs, and to provide power when the CHP system is down for
maintenance or during an emergency outage. Id. Because the supply of natural gas is
generally not dependent upon electricity from the grid, a CHP system can continue to
operate when the electricity grid is impaired, thereby ensuring an uninterrupted supply of
electricity to the host facility. Id.
11. Eisen, supra note 5, at 193 (noting that distributed energy resources "help the
electric grid by increasing grid reliability and resilience, making the grid less vulnerable to
prolonged power failures.").
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benefits that DERs provide to the grid, to ensure that DER
owners and operators receive accurate price signals to stimulate
an economically efficient level of investment.
This article describes the experience of Superstorm Sandy and
the resilience benefits that were provided by DERs and
mircrogrids during that particular extreme weather event. The
article then discusses recent developments in the approaches
for compensating DERs, which is driving the need to quantify
the resilience benefits of DERs. Next, the article will review
recent efforts to place a value on the resilience benefits of DERs,
followed by some concluding observations.
II. SUPERSTORM SANDY AND
THE SUCCESSES OF DERS
A. The Impact of Superstorm Sandy on
Utility Systems in the Northeast
Superstorm Sandy was the worst natural disaster to strike
Con Edison's customers in the history of that utility, causing
five times as many outages as the next-largest storm, Hurricane
Irene.12 In Sandy's immediate aftermath, 1,115,000 of Con
Edison's 3.3 million customers were without power.13 Con Edison
(and its mutual aid crews) ultimately replaced 140 miles of
electric cable and responded to damages at 30,000 different
locations, and used a six-month supply of utility poles and
transformers in a single week.14 "Within 12 days, the company
had restored service to 98 percent of the customers affected by
the storm."15
In New Jersey, Superstorm Sandy was the largest and worst
storm in the history of PSE&G, affecting approximately 2 million
of its customers.16 The impact of Superstorm Sandy involved
more than twice the number of customers than were affected
by Hurricane Irene, with over 90 percent of PSE&G's customer
12. Superstorm Sandy, 2013 State of the Company, CON EDISON (2013), http://www.
conedison.com/ehs/20 12-sustainability-report/engaging-stakeholders/reliability/superstorm-
sandy/index.html#gsc.tab=0.
13. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Case 13-E-0030 Before the
N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm'n at 15, http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.
aspx?DocRefld={A3EFED44-5E61-42B6-9348-7AB59BAA8CB5} (testimony of Electric
Infrastructure and Operations Panel).
14. See Superstorm Sandy, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Petition of PSE&G, Dockets E013021055 and G013020156, New Jersey Board of




base losing power.17 Ninety-six electric substations, or 39
percent of its substations were affected, and 51 of 154 PSE&G
transmission lines, or 33 percent of lines, totaling 1,517 miles
in length, were interrupted.1 8 In PSE&G's service territory, 355
of its sub transmission lines, totaling 2,499 miles in length,
were interrupted, 320 miles of conductor were replaced from
Newark to Pittsburgh, 2,427 utility poles were replaced and/
or damaged, 1,022 transformers were damaged, and 1,282
overhead and underground distribution circuits were damaged.19
PSE&G estimated the cost associated with the restoration of
its distribution and transmission system following the impact
of Superstorm Sandy and the subsequent Nor'easter was
approximately $250-$300 million.20
B. The Performance of DG Resources
during Superstorm Sandy
Following Superstorm Sandy, the consulting firm ICF
International prepared a report highlighting the role of DG
resources, and CHP facilities in particular, in improving the
resiliency of critical infrastructure facilities during the extended
power outages caused by Superstorm Sandy.21 "Critical
infrastructure" facilities were defined to include "those assets,
systems and networks that, if incapacitated, would have a
substantial negative impact on national or regional security,
economic operations, or public health and safety."22 The ICF
Report includes fourteen "case studies" where CHP facilities
improved system resiliency through "mitigating the impacts of
an emergency by keeping critical facilities running without
any interruption in electric or thermal service. The report noted
that depending upon how the CHP system is configured, it
can continue to operate even if the electricity grid is impaired,
thereby "ensuring an uninterrupted supply of power and heating
or cooling to the host facility." 2 3
Included in the case studies were four microgrids operated
by educational institutions, where the campuses essentially
17. Id.
18. PSE&G OUTLOOK, SPECIAL EDITION: SUPERSTORM SANDY (Dec. 2012), at 2,
http://www.pseg.com/info/retiree/pdf/Outlook_1212_Sandy.pdf.
19. Id.
20. PSE&G, PSEG ESTIMATES THE UTILITY'S COST OF SUPERSTORM SANDY
RESTORATION, (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.pseg.com/info/media/newsreleases/2012/2012-12-
04.jsp#.UoOLMKMo67O.
21. See ICF REPORT, supra note 10.
22. See ICF REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, n.1 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
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disconnected from the grid and relied on self-generated power and
heat. The Washington Square Campus of New York University
was served during Superstorm Sandy by a 14.4 MW combined
cycle CHP system installed in 2010.24 The electricity generated
supplied twenty-two campus buildings, while the steam is used to
produce hot water for thirty-seven campus buildings and meets
100 percent of their space heating, space cooling, and hot water
needs.25 NYU's core campus maintained both power and heat
during Superstorm Sandy; the University's CHP system went
into island mode when the local grid went down, isolating itself
from Con Edison's network.26 The system provided uninterrupted
electricity, heating, and cooling to the campus, and also enabled
NYU and New York City officials to set up a command post on
the campus as well as serve area residents forced to evacuate
their homes in the wake of the storm.27
Princeton University in Princeton, NJ has a district energy
facility consisting of a 15 MW gas turbine CHP system that
produces electricity, steam, and chilled water for the campus.28
During Superstorm Sandy, the University was able to continue
running normally due to the CHP plant.29 Princeton disconnected
from the grid and used its district energy CHP system to power
the campus, and the plant produced 100 percent of campus energy
needs from Monday evening to Wednesday evening when the
University was able to receive power from the grid again.30 The
CHP system was also able to provide uninterrupted steam and
chilled water service.31
Two other college campuses had similar experiences. The
College of New Jersey in Ewing, NJ, with its 5.2 MW gas turbine,
also went into "island mode" during the storm, severing the
connection between the campus and the electric grid so that the
campus could continue to operate despite grid disruptions.32
The campus stayed in island mode for about a week, because of
severe utility infrastructure problems.33 Salem Community College
in Carney's Point, NJ, disconnected its 300 kW microturbine
facility from the grid on Sunday morning, October 28, and it
operated continuously until the morning of November 1, allowing
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See ICF REPORT, supra note 10, at 29.




32. Id. at 18.
33. See ICF REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.
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the American Red Cross to open a disaster relief shelter in the
DuPont Field House in Davidow Hall at 6:00 pm Sunday evening
in preparation for the storm.34
Several hospitals equipped with on-site DG resources also
functioned normally during Superstorm Sandy and its aftermath.
South Oaks Hospital in Amityville, NY, isolated itself from the
Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) grid on the evening of
October 28 and remained disconnected from the grid for
approximately fifteen days.35 It was able to provide critical
services for two weeks relying solely on its 1.25 MW reciprocating
engine CHP system.36 The area surrounding Greenwich Hospital
in Greenwich, Connecticut, lost power due to Superstorm Sandy
for approximately seven days but, due to its 2.5 MW reciprocating
engine CHP system, Greenwich Hospital was able to continue
normal operations throughout the storm.37 The Christian Health
Care Center (CHCC) in Wyckoff, NJ is equipped with a 260 kW
microturbine and three emergency backup generators.38 During
Superstorm Sandy, the CHCC ran smoothly, with only
a momentary loss of power, and ran independently of the grid
for ninety-seven hours, meeting all of its residents' power, heat,
and hot water needs.39
With the benefit of on-site DG resources, a housing
development in The Bronx, NY was also able to maintain heat
and power for its 60,000 plus residents, notwithstanding the heavy
impacts suffered in the surrounding area, with trees blown over
and extended power outages.40 Co-op City, one of the largest
cooperative housing developments in the country, is spread out
over 330 acres in the Bronx, and includes 14,000 apartments,
thirty-five high-rises, seven clusters of townhouses, eight parking
garages, three shopping centers, one high school, two middle
schools, and three grade schools.4 1 It is served by a 40 MW natural
gas-fired combined cycle CHP plant installed in 2011, which
provides about 95 percent of the electric and thermal needs of
the community.4 2
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 14.
38. See ICF REPORT, supra note 10, at 15.
39. Id.
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On Long Island, a district energy CHP system providing
thermal energy to Nassau University Medical Center and Nassau
Community College was able to continue operating throughout
the storm and its aftermath, without any operational issues.43 The
57 MW system, operated by Nassau Energy Corporation in Garden
City, NY, as also able to continue supplying power to the Long
Island Power Authority.44
Another form of critical infrastructure-data centers providing
hundreds of companies with office telecommunications support-
benefitted from on-site DG resources during Superstorm Sandy.
The Public Interest Data Center at 50 West 1 7 th Street in
Manhattan, with its 65 kW microturbine-based CHP system,
was able to remain fully operational even though power to the
building and surrounding area was out for over two days.45 Finally,
a major manufacturing facility was able to continue operating, and
became a "center of refuge" for the surrounding area when its
facilities were opened up to provide showers and cell phone
charging, and the cafeteria offered meals and a source of clean
water.4 6 The Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in Stratford,
Connecticut, is equipped with a 10.7 MW gas turbine that
supplies 84 percent of the two million square foot facility's
power needs and a CHP system that provides 85 percent of the
facility's steam heating needs.4 7 The facility's CHP system did not
experience any disruptions during Superstorm Sandy, and 9,000
people were able to come to work the day following the storm.4 8
III. THE EVOLVING APPROACHES
FOR COMPENSATING DERS
A. Moving Away from Compensation
Based on the Retail Rate
The vast majority of states in the U.S. have net metering
in place, which generally requires utilities to purchase the output
of customer-sited DERs. According to the DSIRE website, forty-
four states plus the District of Columbia have mandatory net
metering rules in place.4 9 Net metering historically used the
retail rate of the serving utility as the basis for compensating
43. See ICF REPORT, supra note 10, at 25.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 31.
47. Id.
48. Id.




DER output.5 0 In other words, the output of a DER would
simply offset purchases that the customer would otherwise make
from the grid, and the serving utility would effectively pay the
equivalent of its retail rate for any net deliveries from the DER.
While not necessarily a price that precisely reflected the value of
the contributions of a DER to the electrical grid, using the retail
rate was understandable and fairly easy to administer.
In more recent years, solar photovoltaic ("PV") installations
began to achieve significant penetration in solar-favorable
states such as Arizona, Nevada and Utah, and the costs of solar
PV installations continued to decline through increased panel
efficiency and reductions in "soft costs" associated with
installations. In response, policymakers began to evaluate
cross-subsidization issues (i.e., whether continuing to pay the
retail rate for DER output resulted in generating customers
being subsidized by non-generating customers). Several states
commenced proceedings to revisit net metering rates, with an
eye toward setting a rate for net deliveries to the grid reflecting
the actual value these resources contributed to the grid.
One such state, Minnesota, passed legislation in 2013
requiring a determination of the value of distributed solar PV
installations, or a "value of solar" rate.5 1 The process required by
the legislation produced an extensive analysis quantifying the
benefits produced by interconnecting distributed solar PV
facilities to the utility grid.52 The 2013 legislation required a
number of benefits from distributed PV to be quantified, including
the value of fuel costs, generation capacity, transmission capacity,
transmission and distribution line losses, and environmental
value.53 The goal of the process was to produce a tariff for buyback
rates that the utility would pay for solar-generated power, with
tariff rates that would "quantify the value of distributed PV
electricity."54 If the rates are set correctly, "the utility and its
ratepayers would be indifferent to whether the electricity is
supplied from customer-owned PV or from comparable
50. See Solar Energy and Net Metering, EDISON ELEC. INST., https://www.eei.org/
issuesandpolicy/generation/NetMetering/Documents/Straight% 20Talk% 20About% O20Net% 20
Metering.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
51. The legislation passed by Minnesota in 2013 allows investor-owned utilities in the
state to apply to the Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Value of Solar (VOS) tariff as an
alternative to the net metering provisions that would otherwise apply to purchases from the
output of solar installations. MN Laws 2013, Chap. 85 HF 729, Art. 9, Sec. 10.
52. CLEAN POWER RESEARCH, Minnesota Value of Solar: Methodology, Jan. 31, 2014,
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPoup
&documentld=%7bEE336D 18-74C3-4534-AC9F-0BA56F788EC4%7d&documentTitle=
20141-96033-02 [hereinafter MN VALUE OF SOLAR], at ii.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1.
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conventional means."5 5 Under the methodology filed with the
Minnesota PUC in January 2014, a value was placed on the fuels
cost avoided by the utility, based on the PV output displacing
natural gas-fired units during PV operating hours.5 6 Similarly, the
PV unit would allow the utility to avoid generation capacity cost-
the capital cost of generation the utility would be built to meet
peak load-as well as avoided transmission capacity and
distribution capacity costs-the capital cost of transmission and
distribution facilities that will not have to be built.5 7 The
methodology also allowed for "adders" for location-specific avoided
costs, to allow higher rates to be paid in areas wither capacity is
most needed.5 8 Investor-owned utilities were authorized to apply to
the Minnesota Public Utility Commission for a "value of solar"
tariff as an alternative to net metering.59
In what was described as a "groundbreaking methodology" at
the time, Minnesota added a "'climate factor' to utility rates based
on potential dollar damage to society from future storms and
flooding caused by the impact of rising global temperatures."60
The "avoided environmental cost" is calculated based on the
federal social costs of carbon dioxide (C02) emissions and on
the Minnesota PUC-established externality costs for non-C02
emissions (including particulate matter (PMio), carbon monoxide
(CO), lead (Pb), and nitrogen oxide (NOx).61 In the sample
calculation of the "Value of Solar" tariff, 13.5 cents per KWh
is paid for the output of a solar PV installation.62 Nearly half of
that amount, or 6.6 cents/KWh, represents the avoided fuel cost,
while 3.1 cents/KWh represents the avoided environmental cost.63
B. New York's "Value Stack" Approach
The New York Public Service Commission ("NYPSC") has
attracted considerable attention with its "value stack" approach
to compensating DERs. As part of its "Reforming the Energy
Vision", or "REV," proceeding initiated in April 2014, the NYPSC
in March 2017 commenced a "value of distributed energy
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4, 5.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 33.
59. DSIRE, Minnesota Value of Solar Tariff, https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/
program/detail/5666.
60. Peter Behr, Minn. Tries to Put a Climate Value on Rooftop Solar, E&E NEWS,
Jan. 2, 2014, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059992297.
61. MN VALUE OF SOLAR, supra note 52, at 39.




resources" proceeding to determine the value of contributions
provided by DERs to the grid, as a successor to the traditional
net metering tariff based on retail rates. In its VDER TRANSITION
ORDER, the NYPSC directed that compensation for eligible DERs
transition from net energy metering to the value stack, which
is a "compensation structure for... [DERs] based on the benefits
they create and the costs they impose."6 4 DERs subject to the
value stack receive compensation for the energy they inject into
the grid for a set of values calculated based on the utility costs
they offset, as follows:
* Energy Value, based on the energy commodity purchase
offset by each kWh injected, generally measured by reference
to the location-based marginal price ("LBMP") as determined
by the New York Independent System Operator;
* Capacity Value, based on the purchase of installed capacity
that is offset by the injections from the DER;
* Environmental Value, based on the higher of (1) the
procurement price for a renewable energy certificate (REC), or
(2) the social cost of carbon;
* Demand Reduction Value, based on the distribution costs
offset by injections, averaged across the utility's service
territory; and
* Locational System Relief Value, which is available only
in locations that the utility has identified as having needs that
can be addressed by DERs and based on the higher, specific
distribution costs offset by injections in that area.65
The VDER docket since March 2017 has been focused on
developing values for each of these components, to be incorporated
into the successor net metering tariff to become effective as of
January 1, 2020. Without exploring the details of those
deliberations and decisions of the NYPSC, the essential point
of the discussion is the increased emphasis on determining the
dollar value of the benefits that DERs contribute to the grid. In
a sense, if the value cannot be quantified, then it may not be
compensated under either New York's value stack approach or
the "value of solar" approach followed by Minnesota and other
states. In the case of resilience benefits, the next section describes
64. Order on Net Energy Metering Transition, Phase One of Value of Distributed
Energy Resources, and Related Matters, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 15-E-0751 (Mar. 9,
2017) at 9.
65. Id. at 15-16.
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some of the efforts that have been made to quantify the benefits
that DERs provide to the grid in the form of increased resilience.
It is particularly urgent for CHP resources that a dollar value
be placed on the resilience benefits they provide to the grid. As
noted in Section II.B. above, CHP facilities-and microgrids
reliant upon CHP facilities-performed particularly well in
"keeping the lights on" in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy.
Because these CHP facilities were fueled with either diesel fuel
or natural gas, however, they will not fare well under the benefit-
cost analysis ("BCA") employed by the NYPSC for valuing DERs.
Under the NYPSC's Order Establishing the Benefit Cost Analysis
Framework, the Commission determined that the impact of carbon
dioxide (C02) emissions from DERs need to be reflected in the BCA
framework.66 According to the NYPSC, "[a] bridge to the future
that recognizes the cost of carbon is needed," and the Commission
cited the social cost of carbon as determined by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") as the starting point.67 Given that a
price is already placed on carbon in New York through the
emissions trading program operated by the Northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or "RGGI," the NYPSC determined
that the value used in the BCA analysis would be the difference
between the social cost of carbon as set by EPA and the price
prevailing for RGGI carbon allowances.68
Because CHP resources will be "burdened" with this cost
of carbon under typical cost/benefit analyses, policymakers are
unlikely to provide incentives for CHP installations unless the
resilience value of these resources-as demonstrated at least
qualitatively, if not quantitatively, in the aftermath of Superstorm
Sandy-can offset in part the negative attributes of burning a
fossil fuel to produce the valued reliability. As battery storage
technology improves, microgrids in the future may cease to be
reliant on CHP; a solar array coupled with battery storage may
enable a microgrid to operate independently from the grid.
Currently, however, 82 percent of installed capacity for microgrids
is driven by fossil fuels (60 percent of which is diesel, and 40
percent of which is natural gas),6 9 and 64 percent of all CHP
capacity is fueled by natural gas.70 For CHP-based microgrids,
66. Order Establishing the Benefit Cost Analysis Framework, N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, No. 14-M-0101 (Jan. 21, 2016), at 18.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Adam Hirsch, Yael Parag, Josep Guerrero, Microgrids: A Review of Technologies,
Key Drivers, and Outstanding Issues, RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 90,
2018, at 402-411.
70. DOE, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy: Combined Heat and Power
Technology Fact Sheet Series, https://betterbuildingssolutioncenter.energy.gov/sites/default/
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their economic viability under common cost/benefit analyses will
largely depend upon quantifying the economic value to the grid of
resilience benefits which, as discussed in the following section, is a
challenging endeavor.
IV. QUANTIFYING THE
RESILIENCE BENEFITS OF DERS
A. Defining "Resilience"
The concept of resilience is increasingly being mentioned in
the context of infrastructure and essential services in the wake of
extreme weather events. In the NYS 2100 Commission Report, for
example, resilience is defined as "the ability of a system to
withstand shocks and stresses while still maintaining its essential
functions."71 The Report also mentions a second concept associated
with resilience, as noted above: "resilient systems are also better
able to repair and recover afterwards."72 In contrast to resilient
systems, those that are more vulnerable were described in the
Report as "those that are brittle, at stretched capacity, or with
very low diversity."73
With respect to the resilience of electric utility systems, a
2002 report of the National Research Council identified the
vulnerabilities of the electric system to intentional disruptions,
and noted the potential role of DERs in achieving "an intelligent,
adaptive power grid":
The trend over time has been to build large, remote generating
plants, which require large, complex transmission systems. Today
there is a growing interest in distributed generation-generators
of a more modest size in close proximity to load centers. This
trend may lead to a more flexible grid in which islanding to
maintain key loads are [sic] easier to achieve. Improved security
from distributed generation should be credited when planning
the future of the grid.74
The decision of the New York PSC in the Con Edison case
defined resiliency as "encompass [ing] more than hardening
existing utility infrastructure against the impact of severe
files/attachments/CHP% 200verview- 120817_compliant_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
71. NYS 2100 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.
72. Id.
73. Id. The NYS 2100 COMMIsSION REPORT identified several features that are
common to most resilient systems: "having spare or latent capacity (redundancy); ensuring
flexibility and responsiveness; managing for safe failure (building resistance to domino
effects); and having the capacity to recover quickly and evolve over time." Id.
74. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Making the Nation Safer-the Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS (2002).
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storms."7 5 Adopting the definition from the NYS 2100 Report,
the Con Edison Order defined resilience as "the ability of a
system to withstand shocks while still maintaining its essential
functions."76 When the Department of Energy and the President's
Council on Economic Advisors examined the economic benefits
of grid resiliency, they defined a more resilient grid as "one that
is better able to sustain and recover from adverse events like
severe weather."77 Their report noted that the cost of weather
induced outages range from twenty-five to seventy billion dollars
annually, with these costs taking various forms "including
lost output and wages, spoiled inventory, delayed production,
inconvenience and damage to the electric grid."7 8 The report
recommended continued investment in grid modernization and
resilience in order to mitigate these costs over time, and thereby
save "the economy billions of dollars and reducing the hardship
experienced by millions of Americans when extreme weather
strikes."79
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required DOE to conduct a
study of the benefits of DG and the rate-related issues that impede
their expansion;80 DOE's February 2007 study identifies many of
these benefits.81 The DOE Study identified the potential role of
DG resources in improving resilience, "through its reliance on
larger numbers of smaller and more geographically disperse
power plants, rather than large, central station power plants and
bulk-power transmission facilities."82 While acknowledging that
the greater number of smaller-scale power plants in a DG-
based system would increase the number of targets vulnerable
in an attack, it also "reduce[s] the number of customers who
might potentially be affected."83 The DOE Study also noted the
reduced vulnerability when utility customers are able to "island"
themselves in microgrid arrangements, which are particularly
important in the case of "critical infrastructure facilities such as
fire and safety buildings, telecommunications systems, hospitals,
75. Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint
Proposal, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 13-E-0030 (January 21, 2016) at 63, n.47.
76. Id.
77. Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to Weather Outages,
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%o20Resiliency%/o2OReportFINAL.pdf., at 5.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id.
80. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1817, 119 Stat. 594, 1130-31
(2005).
81. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT VIAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION, https://www.fere.gov/legal/
fed-sta/exp-study.pdf (2005) [hereinafter DOE STUDY].




and natural gas and oil delivery stations."84 The DOE Study
described DG as a "viable means" for "improving the resilience
of electrical infrastructure," and cited the "actual cases in which
DG continued to provide power to critical facilities during times
of large-scale power disruptions and outages."85 According to the
conclusions of the DOE Study, "[a] resilient grid can avert many
types of losses, be they economic, material, or information, or
losses of human life, health, safety, and communications."86
Most recently, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") had an opportunity to consider the issue of resilience
in the context of the bulk power system. In September 2017,
DOE offered a proposed rule pursuant to section 403 of the
Federal Power Act under which nuclear and coal plants with a
ninety-day fuel supply on-site would be recognized as "reliability
and resilience resources." Although FERC rejected the proposed
rule, it commenced a separate proceeding to consider resilience.
In doing so, it defined resilience as: "The ability to withstand
and reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events,
which includes the capability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to,
and/or rapidly recover from such an event."8 7
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC") issued a report in April 2019 on the resilience value
of DERs, and adopted the following definition of resilience:
"Robustness and recovery characteristics of utility infrastructure
and operations, which avoid or minimize interruptions of service
during an extraordinary and hazardous event."88
B. Efforts to Quantify the
Resilience Benefits of DERs
The NARUC Report referenced above, which was devoted to
the question of placing a value on the resilience provided by
DERs, found that although regulators have identified resilience
as an important benefit provided by DERs, no specific value of
resilience was determined in the regulatory proceedings examined
84. Id.
85. Id. at 7-12.
86. Id.
87. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and
Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61, 012 (Jan. 8. 2018), https://www.
ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180108161614-RM18-1-OOO.pdfat 13.
88. CONVERGE STRATEGIES, LLC, THE VALUE OF RESILIENCE FOR DISTRIBUTED
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in the study.89 Rather, the proceedings-two in Maryland and
one in Illinois-included qualitative arguments for and against
resilience investments, but did not quantify or monetize
resilience.90
The NARUC Report also examined four case studies in which
a value of resilience was incorporated into decision-making.91
According to the Report, placing a value on avoided power
interruptions is currently the "standard proxy" for quantifying
energy resilience.92 Based on the case studies, the Report
identified four different specific methods used to analyze the
resilience value of DER:
* Contingent valuation: This is a "stated preference" method
that uses surveys or interviews to directly ask customers about
their intended (or actual) behavior. In this case, utility
customers would be asked to give a hypothetical willingness-to-
pay for better service or a willingness-to-accept a payment for
less reliable service.93
* Defensive behavior: This is a "revealed preference'".
approach that considers the amount that customers have paid
to avoid the negative consequences of a power interruption,
such as the costs of purchasing and maintaining a back-up
diesel generator.94
* Damage cost: This "revealed preference" approach
calculates the actual costs that may be experienced by different
groups (in this case, customers) during a power interruption.
For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
89. Id. at 4.
90. In Baltimore Gas & Electric Company ("BGE"), Case No. 9416, the Maryland
Public Service Commission considered a proposal for two community microgrid pilots;
resilience was repeatedly identified as a benefit of the proposed microgrids, but PSC staff
challenged many of the resilience benefits that BGE claimed would be provided to
surrounding communities. NARUC REPORT, supra note 88, at 11. In Commonwealth Edison
("ComEd"), Docket 17-0331, the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC") considered a
microgrid project that ComEd claimed would serve as a "resilient oasis" for the surrounding
community in the event of a power interruption. The ICC approved the proposal without
requiring a quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 12-13. In Potomac Electric Power
Company ("PEPCO"), Case No. 9361, the Maryland Public Service Commission considered a
proposal for two community microgrids in which PEPCO claimed that resilience would have
been the primary benefit. PEPCO "use[dl [ani [Interruption Cost Estimate ("ICE")]
[c]alculator to estimate two benefits for customers connected to the microgrid - 'outage
avoidance benefits to microgrid participants' ($7.6 million) and 'resiliency savings' ($8.3
million)." But the Maryland PSC rejected the proposal in part because of PEPCO's failure to
quantify the community resilience benefits (i.e., the thousands of customers who may
indirectly benefit from the microgrids). Id. at 13-15.
91. NARUC REPORT, supra note 88, at 4.
92. Id. at 4.




("FEMA") examines the damage costs associated with increased
injuries and lives lost from degraded critical services during
power interruptions.9 5
* Input-output modeling: This is an "economy-wide" approach
that examines "the effects of power interruptions on regional
economies using indicators such as economic output and
employment."96
The NARUC Report evaluated these different methods
according to usefulness to regulators, using four criteria: ease
of use, scope of outputs, geographic scalability, and power
interruption duration analysis capability.9 7 The Report concluded
that none of the methods reviewed met all four criteria for
regulator usefulness and usability, and thus that no single
method captured all regulatory concerns regarding the resilience
value of DERs.98
The Clean Energy Group prepared an analysis of energy
storage that also touched on the resilience value of customer-sited
resources (in this case, battery storage).99 Its report identified
seven non-energy benefits of battery storage, including avoided
power outages, comprising two elements: "[e]nergy system
reliability benefit (the system-wide benefit of fewer grid outages)"
and "[n]on-energy reliability benefits to consumers (customer's
value of backup power)."100 The report put a value of $172/
kWh for residential customers and $15.64/kWh for commercial
customers for "all of the costs that come with outages for both
families and businesses."101 A "key [take-away] from [the] report
... [is that these] non-energy benefits . . . have significant value
and should be included in cost/benefit analyses" when developing
incentives for energy storage.102 Failing to do so means that "the
measure being considered will be under-valued, and . . . may not
pass the cost-effectiveness creen."103
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18.
97. NARUC REPORT, supra note 88, at 4.
98. Id.
99. Todd Olinsky-Paul, Energy Storage: The New Efficiency, CLEAN ENERGY GROUP
(Apr. 2019), https://www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/energy-storage-the-new
-efficiency.pdf [hereinafter CEG STUDY].
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Id. at 19.
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V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is inevitable that compensating DERs will eventually evolve
from the simple and elegant use of retail rates under traditional
net metering to a more rigorous analysis that examines the
value of the benefits that DERs actually contribute to the electrical
grid. The declining costs of solar PV and the general maturing of
the DER market give rise to the issue of whether traditional net
metering based on retail rates is simply too generous for DERs,
and thus results in cost shifts to non-participating customers. In
this "reset" of net metering rates, the emphasis is on increased
precision in compensating DERs according to the value that they
actually confer upon the grid. Whether it is the "value of solar"
approach pioneered in Minnesota and followed in other states or
the "value stack" method being implemented in New York, the
task is identifying the various means by which DERs confer
benefits upon the grid, and attempting to put a dollar value on
the elements of those contributions.
The energy value and the capacity value of DERs are fairly
easy to quantify by reference to the prices determined in
competitive wholesale markets. To some extent, the avoidance of
T&D infrastructure costs similarly is not too difficult to identify.
Environmental benefits, for their part, can be roughly valued
according to the social cost of carbon, or other values placed on
carbon and other pollutants through market-based mechanisms.
DERs that are located in areas where load relief is particularly
valuable can be compensated for that contribution as well, as
is done in New York's locational system relief value ("LSRV")
component. In the case of resilience benefits provided by DERs,
however, the effort to quantify the value conferred upon the
grid is much more difficult. The above-referenced CEG Study
highlights the challenges that regulators have faced in trying
to monetize the seemingly obvious qualitative benefits that DERs
provide.
As illustrated in the CEG Study, the drive to quantify arises
in two different contexts. First, when regulators are considering
whether to allow rate recovery of proposed programs-such as
microgrid projects that provide resilience benefits-the benefits
must exceed the costs before ratepayers can be expected to bear
the costs, and those benefits must be broad-based rather than
limited to the participants in a particular microgrid if the general
body of ratepayers is expected to cover the costs in rates. Second,
policymakers are routinely designing incentives to encourage
investment in resources that achieve various clean energy
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objectives. The development of those incentives depends upon a
rigorous cost/benefit analysis that requires the various costs
and benefits to be quantified to ensure that the benefits exceed
the costs. As noted in the CEG Study, the failure to quantify
and include resilience benefits in those analyses will result in
DERs (or energy storage, in the case of the CEG Study) being
undervalued compared to other measures under consideration,
and thus the price signal designed by regulators in their
incentive programs will produce an economically inefficient level
of investment in DERs.
Much more work must be done to more accurately define
and quantify the resilience benefits of DERs. The NARUC
Report identifies the preliminary efforts thus far and provides a
roadmap for additional analytical tools that need to be developed.
As more states move down the path of compensating DERs
according to the value of their actual contributions to the grid,
more resources can be expected to be devoted to quantifying the
various components of DER contributions, including resilience.
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